The State of Utah v. Mark John Unopulos : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1994
The State of Utah v. Mark John Unopulos : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Ronald S. Fujino, Richard G. Uday; Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass\'N; Attorneys for Appellant.
Jan Graham; Attorney General; Attorney for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Mark John Unopulos, No. 940311 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1994).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5963
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
MARK JOHN UNOPULOS, : Case No. 940311-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for aggravated 
assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-103 (1953 as amended), in the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick, presiding. 
RONALD S. FUJINO 
RICHARD G. UDAY 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
JAN GRAHAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Appellee 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
MARK JOHN UNOPULOS, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 940311-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for aggravated 
assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-103 (1953 as amended), in the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick, presiding. 
RONALD S. FUJINO 
RICHARD G. UDAY 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
JAN GRAHAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW . . . . 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS . . 3 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 11 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. DUE TO THE STATE'S ADMITTED 
DISCOVERY VIOLATIONS, THE COURT ERRED IN 
ALLOWING A POLICE OFFICER TO TESTIFY ABOUT 
EVIDENCE WHICH HAD NOT BEEN DISCLOSED TO THE 
DEFENSE AND WHICH WAS LIKELY TO INFLUENCE THE 
JURY. 12 
POINT II. THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED 
THAT OFFICER ROSE JONES WAS QUALIFIED TO 
TESTIFY AS AN EXPERT WITNESS ABOUT EVIDENCE 
CRITICAL TO THE JURY BUT BEYOND THE SCOPE OF 
THE OFFICER'S KNOWLEDGE. 24 
CONCLUSION 29 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
CASES CITED 
Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1993) 24 
Salt Lake City v. Reynolds, 849 P.2d 582 (Utah App. 
1993) 14, 22 
Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 (Utah App. 1989). 27 
Semper v. Santos, 845 F.2d 1233 (3rd Cir. 1988) . . . 20, 21 
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987) 13, 17 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) 2 
State v. Pendergrass, 803 P.2d 1261 (Utah App. 1990). 3, 24 
State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461 (Utah App. 1993) . . 2, 20, 27 
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993) 2 
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S. Ct. 
3375 (1985) 13 
Watters v. Querry, 626 P.2d 455 (Utah 1981) 20 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f) 1 
Utah R. Crim. P. 16 1, 2, 12, 
13, 15, 17 
Utah R. Crim. P. 26(2) (a) 1 
Utah R. Evid. 702 1, 14, 16, 
19, 24 
ii 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
MARK JOHN UNOPULOS, : Case No. 940311-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f), whereby a defendant in a district 
court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals 
from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a 
first degree or capital felony. See also Utah R. Crim. P. 26(2) (a) . 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and 
constitutional provisions are contained in the text of this brief or 
in Addendum A: 
Utah R. Crim. P. 16 
Utah R. Evid. 702 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. If a police officer remains unlisted as a State witness 
until the day of trial and the defense is denied access to evidence 
critical to cross-examination of the officer, does the admitted 
discovery violation require the court to prohibit the officer from 
testifying about the undisclosed evidence? 
A trial court's interpretation of the rule relating to 
discovery, Utah R. Crim. P. 16, is reviewed for correctness. State 
v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 472 (Utah App. 1993) ("The trial court's 
decision that the State was not required by Rule 16 to give such 
notice before trial was a legal conclusion, and we therefore review 
that conclusion for correctness"). Admission of the expert 
testimony, though, is an issue of discretion.1 See Tennyson, 850 
P.2d at 471 ("The trial court possesses discretion as to the 
appropriateness of expert testimony in a specific case,. This court 
'will not reverse that determination on appeal in the "absence of a 
clear showing of abuse"'"). 
1. Admissibility decisions have recently come under 
further scrutiny. While an admissibility decision is a question of 
law, see State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1270 n.ll (Utah 1993), 
the critical question, and one of some subtlety, 
arises only after we have said that an issue is a 
question of law and no deference is owed the trial 
court. At this point, we must attempt to determine 
when the articulated legal rule to be applied to a set 
of facts--a rule that we establish without deference 
to the trial courts--embodies a de facto grant of 
discretion which permits the trial court to reach one 
of several possible conclusions about the legal effect 
of a particular set of facts without risking reversal. 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 1994) (the degree of 
discretion given a trial judge who applies a legal principle to the 
facts of a case is analogized to the size of a pasture which, 
depending on the circumstances, may range from being quite narrow to 
extremely broad; see also id. at 937-38 (while the size of the 
pasture for the admission of evidence is considerable, the standard 
of review for the legal issue is ultimately one of law). 
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2. Was expert testimony on acceleration improperly admitted 
to suggest an intent to injure when markings on the defendant's tires 
may have been produced elsewhere? 
"When addressing the admissibility of expert testimony, a 
trial court must determine whether there is a sufficient foundation 
for the expert's opinion. 'The trial court is allowed considerable 
latitude of discretion in the admissibility of expert testimony, and 
in the absence of a clear showing of abuse, this court will not 
reverse." State v. Pendergrass, 803 P.2d 1261, 1265 (Utah App. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-103, in the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, 
presiding. (R 123). On March 16, 1994, a jury found Mr. Mark J. 
Unopulos guilty of the above offense (which involved Kyle Bateman). 
(R 110-12). The jury was unpersuaded in regards to two other 
allegations, though, finding Mr. Unopulos not guilty of similar 
charges against Margie Bateman and Madison Bateman. 
On April 22, 1994, the court sentenced Mr. Unopulos to an 
indeterminate term of zero-to-five years in the Utah State Prison 
together with various court-ordered amounts. (R 123). The court 
then stayed the sentence and placed Mr. Unopulos on probation for 
eighteen months. (R 123-24; 152-54). 
- 3 -
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On July 13, 1993, Mark John Unopulos and his fourteen-year 
old son spent most of the day " [r]eplacing the clutch in [Mark's] 
'74 Ford pickup and adjusting the brakes." (R 334; Transcript of 
Trial [IfTf!] , page 176) . Mark was concerned with "shifting problems 
with [the transmission], the grinding to get into gear and stuff." 
(R 359; T 201) . 
After working on the aged pickup, he drove north on 10th 
West where he tested the brakes and clutch. (R 357-58; T 199-200) . 
Mark approached the intersection of 10th West and Fourth South, 
"going fairly fast . . . [when he] noticed [a] white car . . . 
[near] the middle of the intersection, . . . " (R 336; T 178). "I 
[Mark Unopulos] was hard braking to stop for the stop sign and I 
noticed [the driver of the white car,] Mr. Bateman reach over his 
wife and he was quite angry and he gave me a finger gesture." 
(R 336; T 178). Karl Lee Bateman, his wife Margie Lynn, and their 
daughter Madison were in the white car, a 1993 Festiva. (R 246-49; 
T 88-91) . 
Mark denied running the stop sign, (R 337, T 179), but 
Margie Bateman testified that he went "a couple feet" into the 
intersection. (R 237; T 79). Karl Bateman also claimed that Mark 
came within "[m]aybe three feet" of his car. (R 249; T 91). 
Although Margie screamed and Karl swerved into another lane, Karl 
said he was not angry at Mark for almost hitting his family in his 
brand new Festiva. (R 249, 262-63; T 91, 104-05). 
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In response to the finger gesture and cussing -- actions 
denied by the Batemans -- Mark turned his pickup around and drove 
after the departing Festiva. (R 367, T 209). According to Karl 
Bateman, "he [Mark] made that turn coming out of 10th West on Fourth 
South, he left a black mark of rubber and I could see the tires 
peeling as he swung around, so I figured there was going to be some 
kind of a problem, so that's why I immediately took a right on Post, 
pulled over, got out of the vehicle." (R 251; T 93). Karl also 
noticed Mark shrug, putting "his hands in the air when I [Karl] 
glanced at him . . . [1]ike maybe he made a mistake or something." 
(R 264; T 106). 
Mark lost sight of the Festiva because the corner of Post 
Street was obstructed by garbage piled high on the sidewalks in 
anticipation of the city clean up. (R 257-58, 339; T 99-100, 181). 
Karl acknowledged the existence of garbage located in front of where 
he had parked, although there was disagreement as to whether it 
amounted to a visual obstruction. (R 258, 260; T 100, 102) (Karl 
claimed that he parked between the third and fourth house from the 
corner and "just in front of [him] would have been a garbage pile" 
consisting of "brush and I remember there was a TV in it[,] . . . 
maybe a couch or a chair or something"). However, Karl's claimed 
parking spot differed from the location pinpointed by his wife and a 
number of eyewitnesses residing on Post Street. (R 215, 218; T 57, 
60) (Ordin Broadbent, a resident on Post Street, testified that the 
Festiva parked about 15 feet from the corner "in between the first 
house and the second house"); (R 310; T 152) (the person living on 
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the corner lot of Post Street, Kent Hay, testifed that the Festiva 
parked in front of his house bordering his neighbor); (R 241; T 83) 
(Margie Bateman testified their Festiva stopped in front of "the 
second house" from the corner); (R 204, 208; T 46, 50) (Rose 
Anderson, another resident on Post Street, stated that the car 
stopped in front of the second house). 
When Mark's pickup "came around this corner, the back end 
of the truck started to fishtail, . . . [I] start[ed] to lose it, 
. . . and then the steering just locked into an arcing curve toward 
the west." (R 341; T 183). Although travelling only about 
25-35 m.p.h., the truck was going too fast for the corner given its 
steering and alignment problems. (R 365, 375-76; T 207, 217-18). 
Mark was unable to control the truck's speed and direction and it 
ended up glancing off the left front section of the Festiva. 
(R 275, 342; T 117, 184). 
Although the slight blow to the car was not enough to harm 
passengers Margie Lynn or daughter Madison, the child, screamed and 
was shakened by the incident. (R 254-55; T 96-97). Karl Bateman, 
who had previously exited the Festiva to confront Mr. Unopulos, was 
not struck by the truck but claimed that he almost was hit standing 
in front of his car. (R 251, T 93) . 
Karl argued that the Ford pickup had accelerated towards 
him and he "darted across the front corner of" the Festiva to avoid 
the collision. (R 252; T 94). However, Karl also testified that a 
truck with manual steering and alignment problems could lock up 
going around a corner. (R 270-72; T 112-14); see also (R 272; 
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T 114) (Karl happened to be an employee of the Ford company). "If 
it [the steering] locks and it binds over into one direction or the 
other, it's going to stay in that direction. Its not going to be 
easy to correct before or after an accident." (R 272; T 114) 
(testimony of Karl Bateman). 
The corroborative testimony of Joe Jiron, a mechanic who 
examined Mark's pickup, was offered as follows: 
the State would be willing to stipulate that Joe 
Richard Jiron, if called, would testify that he 
examined the truck belonging to the Defendant on the 
25th of February of this year [1994], that he observed 
that it had been some time since service work had been 
done on the steering on that vehicle, that he drove 
the truck for approximately 12 blocks, that the 
steering was of a poor quality, and that he found a 
problem with the alignment on the truck, that there 
was a potential for the steering to lock up, that he 
found the brakes to be okay, that he has no knowledge 
or had no knowledge of the condition of the truck on 
the 13th of July of 1993, and that we don't have 
evidence as to the qualifications of Mr. Jiron as a 
mechanic. 
(R 332; T 174). 
Following the collision, Mark panicked and drove home 
without stopping. (R 34 8; T 190). He awaited the arrival of the 
police who had traced the license plate number to his address. 
(R 3 82; T 224). Mark cooperated with the investigation and was 
eventually arrested. (R 349-50; T 191-92). 
The State charged Mr. Unopulos with three counts of 
aggravated assault. (R 79-80) (one count for each occupant in the 
car). After the jury was selected and during a break before opening 
arguments, the State for the first time informed defense counsel 
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that it wanted to call Rose Jones, an officer involved in the case, 
to testify about tire track evidence purportedly found near the 
scene but not mentioned in any of the police reports. (R 279; 
T 121) . 
The State admitted that officer Jones was not present at 
the preliminary hearing and that it did not plan to use her at 
trial. (R 281, 283; T 123, 125). Nevertheless, at trial the State 
attempted to call officer Jones to support its theory that 
Mr. Unopulos had accelerated his truck into the white Festiva. 
(R 279; T 121). 
The court initially ruled against the State. (R 285; 
T 127). Since most of the State's case had already been presented, 
the court held: 
wholly aside from the problematical question of 
whether or not a Salt Lake City police officer could 
qualify under Rule 702 for purposes of providing 
expert testimony, wholly aside from that, and that is 
problematical, it seems to me that the proffered 
testimony of the officer [Jones] is more in the nature 
of corroboration and/or cumulative to what's already 
been testified to, and it seems moreover to me that 
given the fact that the additional testimony came as a 
surprise to both the Prosecution and certainly to the 
Defense, and moreover, Mr. Blaylock [the prosecutor], 
that your intent was to proceed with this trial even 
without knowing that additional information, that to 
avoid the potential of creating error here which might 
well result in a reversal in the event there's a 
conviction, it seems to me that it's probably 
reasonable at this point to exclude that aspect of the 
officer's testimony. 
(R 284-85; T 126-27) . Notwithstanding its prior ruling, the court 
later changed its mind and allowed officer Jones to testify after 
- 8 -
deeming her qualified as an expert witness. (R 387, 392; T 229, 
234) . 
Jones testified that she photographed tire marks discovered 
near the scene -- apparently revealing acceleration, yet the officer 
declined to disclose that fact in her report because, in her 
opinion, they "didn't turn out very well that you could see very 
much in them." (R 391; T 233). Due to the nondisclosure, however, 
Mr. Unopulos did not have the opportunity to either examine the 
photographs or to determine independently whether he could use 
them. (R 393, T 235). 
Jones also testified about other purported signs of 
acceleration found near the scene: fresh rubber scraped off the 
street by Jones with her fingernail. (R 416; T 258) . That 
evidence, however, was not kept by Jones nor was her discovery 
reported to the defense. (R 416; T 258). While such evidence may 
constitute one method for determining the freshness of rubber, other 
methods potentially available to Mr. Unopulos could not be addressed 
on cross-examination because Jones had discarded the evidence and 
prevented further analysis. (R 416; T 258) . 
Officer Jones, the chief investigating official for the 
collision, acknowledged that the thoroughness of her report may be 
at issue before a judge or jury. (R 422; T 264). "That's why I 
made extra notes [,]" officer Jones argued in apparent reference to 
her three or four page police report. (R 417, 422; T 259, 264). 
However, the report prepared by Jones and the supplemental reports 
from other officers all failed to mention the physical evidence of 
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acceleration now suddenly relied on by the State for the purpose of 
persuading the jury at trial, (R 279, 283; T 121, 125). 
Interestingly, Jones herself conceded that when a finding 
is omitted from her police report, a reasonable assumption would be 
that the matter did not come to light. (R 381; T 223). For 
example, in regards to the gestures by Karl Bateman, officer Jones 
testified, "I don't recall asking him that [about the gestures]. If 
it's not here [in the police report], I probably did not." (R 381; 
T 223) (emphasis added). Similarly, since Jones' police report said 
nothing about the physical evidence of acceleration, the officer's 
omission was consistent with Mr. Unopulos' belief that no such 
evidence existed and that nothing additional would be presented. 
(R 393; T 235). 
At trial, however, Officer Jones announced for the first 
time that, in her opinion, the physical evidence showed acceleration 
had occurred just prior to the collision. (R 400; T 242) . Jones 
also testified that marks found on the tires of Mark's pickup were 
consistent with acceleration. (R 3 97; T 239). Due to the unknown 
and undisclosed nature of the physical evidence, Mr. Unopulos was 
unable to properly respond to Jones' surprise evidence. 
Following Jones' testimony, the jury concluded that Mark 
Unopulos had "intentionally and knowingly assaulted Karl 
Bateman [.]" (R 102). Mark was convicted of one count of aggravated 
assault and found not guilty on the aggravated assault charges 
pertaining to Margie Bateman and Madison Bateman. (R 110-12) . 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The State violated the discovery requirements when it 
failed to list a police officer as a witness until the morning of 
trial. Mark Unopulos was unable to respond to the officer's 
testimony concerning physical evidence discovered near the scene of 
a collision (photographs of tire markings, marks observed on tires 
which were consistent with acceleration, rubber allegedly scraped 
off the street) because such evidence was never disclosed beforehand 
notwithstanding specific requests by the defense to do so. 
Mr. Unopulos' ability to defend himself was prejudiced by 
the fact that the State's physical evidence was no longer available 
or had since been destroyed. Having been denied access to or 
disclosure of the physical evidence, Mr. Unopulos was hampered in 
his ability to impeach the officer's "expertise" or to call experts 
of his own. 
Police officer Rose Jones should not have ever been allowed 
to testify as an expert witness. Her expressed opinion, that 
Mr. Unopulos had accelerated his truck into another car, was 
unfounded given the lack of information available to her. Jones 
based her opinion in part on the condition of the pickup's tires, 
which indicated that acceleration had recently occurred. Since 
acceleration had also apparently occurred at or near the scene of 
the collision, Jones simply assumed that the markings and the 
pickup's tires were linked. What Jones did not know, however, was 
that acceleration had occurred in locations other than the scene of 
the collision. Officer Jones' opinion lacked the necessary 
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evidentiary reliability and failed to assist the trier of fact in 
determining what had happened at the time of impact. The unknown 
and undisclosed nature of the officer's testimony should have been 
excluded at trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DUE TO THE STATE'S ADMITTED DISCOVERY VIOLATIONS, THE 
COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING A POLICE OFFICER TO TESTIFY 
ABOUT EVIDENCE WHICH HAD NOT BEEN DISCLOSED TO THE 
DEFENSE AND WHICH WAS LIKELY TO INFLUENCE THE JURY 
Discovery requirements are set forth in part by Rule 16, 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states, inter alia: 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor 
shall disclose to the defense upon request the 
following material or information of which he has 
knowledge: 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant 
or codefendant; 
(4) evidence know to the prosecutor that tends to 
negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the 
guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of 
the offense for the reduced punishment; and 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court 
determines on good cause shown should be made 
available to the defendant in order for the 
defendant to adequately prepare his defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon 
as practicable following the filing of charges and 
before the defendant is required to plead. The 
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the 
prosecutor or defense may make disclosure by notifying 
the opposing party that material and information may 
be inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable 
times and places. 
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(g) If at any time during the course of the 
proceedings it is brought to the attention of the 
court that a party has failed to comply with this 
rule, the court may order such party to permit the 
discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or 
prohibit the party from introducing evidence not 
disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it 
deems just under the circumstances. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 16. 
In the case at bar, counsel for Mr. Unopulos requested the 
State to provide "[a] list of all the witnesses that the State 
intends to call for trial in the above-entitled matter, their 
addresses, telephone numbers and criminal records." (R 19); cf. 
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah 1987) (such requests 
"specifically and unmistakably [seek] disclosure of [Utah R. Crim. 
P. 16](a)(5) material consisting of the names and addresses of 
witnesses and their statements"). When a specific request is made, 
the duty of the prosecutor is clear: 
Since the defense made a specific request in 
compliance with the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
the prosecution had a duty to respond. The 
prosecution could respond by providing the information 
or by stating that it would not provide the 
information. If the prosecution refused to provide 
the information, the defense could then move the court 
to compel discovery. But if the prosecution ignored 
the discovery request, or only partially responded to 
it, the requesting party could then logically infer 
that the information was not provided because it did 
not exist. See Knight, 734 P.2d at 917 (citing United 
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375 (1985) 
(recognizing the possibility that an incomplete 
response to a discovery request may mislead the 
defense and impair the adversary process)). 
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Salt Lake City v. Reynolds; 849 P.2d 582 (Utah App. 1993) . 
Despite Mr. Unopulos7 specific request, the actions or 
inactions of the prosecution led him to believe that officer Rose 
Jones would not be called as an expert witness. Officer Jones was 
never listed as a State witness. Jones did not testify at the 
preliminary hearing and the State even acknowledged that it first 
became aware of her "tire markings" testimony only during the 
morning of trial. (R 281; T 123); see also (R 279; T 121) (the 
State and Mr. Unopulos both agreed that officer Jones' police report 
did not indicate her observance or interpretation of brake or 
acceleration marks); accord (R 422; T 264) (officer Jones herself 
admitted she did not mention tire tracks or marks in the police 
reports). The State further admitted that it had every intention of 
proceeding without her at trial. (R 283; T 125). The State's own 
concessions evidenced its failure to disclose Rose Jones as a 
prosecution witness. 
Accordingly, the trial judge decided to "exclude her 
[officer Jones] --or prevent her from testifying regarding tire 
track evidence [.]" (R 280; T 122). The court initially held: 
wholly aside from the problematical question of 
whether or not a Salt Lake City police officer could 
qualify under Rule 702 for purposes of providing 
expert testimony, wholly aside from that, and that is 
problematical, it seems to me that the proffered 
testimony of the officer [Jones] is more in the nature 
of corroboration and/or cumulative to what's already 
been testified to, and it seems moreover to me that 
given the fact that the additional testimony came as a 
surprise to both the Prosecution and certainly to the 
Defense, and moreover, Mr. Blaylock [the prosecutor], 
that your intent was to proceed with this trial even 
without knowing that additional information, that to 
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avoid the potential of creating error here which might 
well result in a reversal in the event there's a 
conviction, it seems to me that it's probably 
reasonable at this point to exclude that aspect of the 
officer's testimony. 
(R 284-85; T 126-27). 
The court's ruling is in accordance with Rule 16(g) of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. "If at any time during the course 
of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that 
a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court may . . . 
prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, . . ." 
Utah R. Crim. P. 16(g) (emphasis added). Further support stems from 
Rule 16(a)(5), a good cause determination implicit in the court's 
ruling that the excluded testimony encompassed evidence which should 
have been "made available to the defendant in order for the 
defendant to adequately prepare his defense." Utah R. Crim. 
P. (a) (5) . Not only did the State violate discovery mandates by not 
listing officer Jones as a prosecution witness, the content of her 
testimony constituted surprise evidence; Jones' qualifications as an 
expert witness on tire markings were questionable; and Mark Unopulos 
was left unable to conduct an investigation of his own. (R 279-88; 
T 121-30) . The court's preliminary ruling was well supported. 
At no time during the trial did Mr. Unopulos' disadvantaged 
position change. In fact, further discovery violations became 
apparent when, over objection from defense counsel, officer Jones 
began testifying on rebuttal. (R 384; T 226). Although in conflict 
with its earlier ruling, the court allowed the State to "proceed 
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with the examination [of Jones until] the time that you [counsel for 
Mr. Unopulos] feels it's objectionable." (R 384; T 226). 
Officer Jones testified about her background (classes on 
and investigation of homicide and traffic cases). (R 384-86; 
T 226-28) . However, as soon as Jones broached the very same 
evidentiary matters which the court had earlier excluded, 
Mr. Unopulos objected. (R 3 84; T 228) . 
Despite Mr. Unopulos' objections, (R 3 84; T 22 8) (on the 
grounds "previously noted" including his alternative motions for a 
continuance or mistrial, [R 281, 284; T 123, 126]), the court ruled 
merely that Jones qualified as an "expert witness".2 (R 387; 
T 229). Nothing in the court's changed ruling, however, addressed 
the still existing concerns regarding the State's nondisclosure of 
officer Jones as a prosecution witness, the surprise nature of her 
testimony on tire markings, and, through no fault of his own, the 
foreclosed ability of Mr. Unopulos to defend himself against officer 
Jones' contentions. (R 279-88; T 121-30). 
The court nevertheless allowed Jones to continue testifying 
even when further discovery violations were revealed. Rule 16 
requires the prosecution to disclose "physical evidence seized from 
the defendant", evidence that tends to negate or mitigate guilt or 
the degree of the offense, or any other item of evidence which, for 
2. The court ruled, "it seems to me that there's 
sufficient foundation laid under Rule 702 that this witness has had 
considerable investigation experience, three to five per day for a 
period of four years. She's taken adequate training for purposes of 
qualifying herself, and I'm convinced and persuaded she's qualified 
in her area of expertise." (R 387; T 229). But see infra Point II. 
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good cause, should be made available to the defendant in order to 
adequately prepare his defense. Utah R. Crim. P. 16(a)(3)-(5). 
Prior to trial, Mark Unopulos specifically requested "[a]ny 
photographs of physical evidence taken from the alleged crime scene 
or taken by any law enforcement officer during the course of the 
investigation of the above-entitled case by any police agency[.]" 
(R 20) . No photographs of tire markings were produced, however, 
notwithstanding officer Jones' admission at trial that on the day in 
question she did in fact photograph tire marks at or near the scene 
of the collision. (R 391; T 233) . 
Officer Jones' photographs of the involved tire marks were 
neither made available nor alluded to in her police report because, 
in Jones' opinion, they "didn't turn out very well that you could 
see very much in them." (R 391; T 233). Jones' assertion, however, 
was an inadequate response which led Mr. Unopulos to believe that 
such evidence did not exist, see Knight, 734 P.2d at 917, and the 
officer's inactions deprived Unopulos of the opportunity to decide 
for himself whether the photographs had exculpatory or mitigating 
value. (R 393, T 235). 
Also omitted from Jones' police report were her results or 
findings relevant to the condition of the pickup's tires. In his 
requests for discovery, Mark Unopulos sought " [r]eports or 
descriptions . . . from defendant's person or . . . vehicle that the 
State intends to use at trial." (R 20). No such information was 
provided. At trial, though, officer Jones offered for the first 
time information undisclosed and unknown to Mr. Unopulos. 
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[Officer Jones:] We examined the tires when we 
brought [Mr. Unopulos'] truck out of the driveway and 
they lifted it up to get it on the tow truck so I 
could get right under and look, rotate them, look at 
the marks on the tires, see where the rubber from the 
tire was left on the roadway. 
Q And what did you find? 
A We found it was clean off, it had been accelerated 
off and braked off. 
The sides -- okay, the sides of the tire, if you're 
looking at a tire this way, this angle, the sides were 
very, very smooth to indicate the skids. Almost 
half-way around the tire, really heavy, the other 
half-way around, heavy to indicate acceleration. The 
smoothness left there is inconsistent with the other 
tires that were involved. 
(R 412-13; T 254-55) . Having no knowledge beforehand of such 
evidence, on cross-examination Mr. Unopulos was left unarmed trying 
to decipher the officer's jargon rather than exposing flaws or gaps 
in the witness' perceptions and interpretations. (R 4 04-16; 
T 246-58) . 
One other discovery violation was brought to the court's 
attention through officer Jones' testimony. Officer Jones testified 
that she scraped fresh rubber off the street as part of a test to 
determine whether acceleration had occurred, but she then discarded 
the evidence without even mentioning the discovery in the police 
report. (R 415-16; T 257-58). Instead of finding an inadequate 
response to Mr. Unopulos' discovery request for "[a]ny reports or 
results of scientific tests taken during the investigation of this 
caselj" (R 20), the court altered its prior ruling and attempted to 
support it on the following grounds: 
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When this matter first came to my attention at the 
beginning of the trial yesterday morning, I think both 
counsel were just at that point aware of the 
additional information the officer may well have 
available. At our discussion at that time, I 
indicated I would preclude the officer from testifying 
in the State's case in chief for the reason that there 
may well be an issue about her qualification as an 
expert under Rule 702, and additionally, the question 
about not knowing what the Defendant's testimony would 
be. Therefore, I stated that I would not allow the 
State to call this officer as a witness in the case in 
chief but that I would reserve the question of whether 
or not she would be allowed as a rebuttal witness 
dependent upon the Defendant's testimony. 
The Defendant took the stand and testified 
essentially that his car was out of control at the 
time he turned the corner, that it locked up and made 
no acceleration. 
It seemed to me, therefore, that the calling of the 
officer was appropriate in terms of rebuttal. 
In addition, in the State's response to the request 
for discovery in the file, the State indicated that 
there may well be other information in police agency 
files which is not available to or in the possession 
of the County Attorney, and in your own copy of the 
report, [Counsel for Mr. Unopulos], the term 
accelerated and the observation that the Defendant 
accelerated prior to the impact is contained therein. 
It seems, therefore, to me that the Defense was on 
notice, but particularly on notice in terms of the 
rebuttal usage of this officer. It seemed to me that 
it was appropriate and therefore, I simply am stating 
my position on the record with a little more 
particularity. 
(R 430-31; T 272-73). 
Despite the court's position, the reasons for changing its 
decision remain legally inadequate. The flaws in each reason are 
discussed below, except for the matter concerning whether Officer 
Jones was unqualified to testify as an expert witness on tire 
tracks, an issue addressed separately in Print II. 
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The court's decision to allow officer Jones as a rebuttal 
witness should not have been dependent upon Mark Unopulos' 
testimony. (R 431; T 273). Unopulos' right to testify and to 
present his own defense is an entitlement3 distinct from the 
decision to exclude Jones as a State witness. Cf. Semper v. Santos, 
845 F.2d 1233, 1288 (3rd Cir. 1988) (in Semper, "had [the physician] 
been permitted to testify [as an expert witness on rebuttal], Semper 
[the nondisclosing party] 'would have profitted from [his] own 
failure to comply with the discovery deadlines,' since defendants 
would have been prejudiced"). The nature of Mr. Unopulos' defense 
should not have been limited by a court reservation which in essence 
said: be careful about how you defend yourself or the State will be 
able to use information unknown and undisclosed to you. (R 431; 
T 273) . 
Where, as here, the State admits that it had planned to 
proceed to trial without officer Jones' testimony, (R 283; T 125), 
the need for a rebuttal witness is diminished. For instance, in 
State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461 (Utah App. 1993), "a rebuttal 
witness whose need could not reasonably have been anticipated" was 
allowed to testify.
 >Id. at 472. " [T] he State was unaware until 
defendant [Tennyson] testified that he was basing his defense on 
intoxication." I^d. at 464. The State in Tennyson "appropriately 
responded to an exigency at trial" by calling an expert witness "to 
3. Cf. Watters v. Querry, 626 P.2d 455, 458 (Utah 1981) 
("The well-recognized general rule entitles a party to have his 
theory of the case submitted to the jury"). 
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rebut defendant's testimony concerning the amount of alcohol he 
drank on the night in question." Id. at 472-73. 
By comparison, no exigency existed in Mr. Unopulos' case 
and the State was aware of his defense. (R 285; T 127). From the 
time of the preliminary hearing until the end of the State's case in 
chief at trial, the State's witnesses and theory of acceleration 
remained consistent. (R 11-12; R 200-303). Equally consistent was 
Mr. Unopulos' defense, unaltered even through the close of trial 
when Mark refused to compromise the prospect of a complete acquittal 
with the insertion of a lesser included offense. (R 432; T 274). 
The State's use of Jones as a rebuttal witness was nothing more than 
an improper "back-door attempt to bolster the case-in-chief." 
Semper v. Santos, 845 F.2d 1233, 1288 (3rd Cir. 1988) . 
The court also reasoned that while other information may 
have existed in police files', because the police report in question 
included the term "accelerated" the defense should have known that 
officer Jones could be called in rebuttal. (R 431; T 273). Not 
only did the court's prior ruling contradict this newfound 
rationale, the parties themselves fairly read the reports to exclude 
such notice of acceleration. 
Officer Jones' police report merely stated, "Victim vehicle 
stopped along curb line on the west side of Post [Street]. 
Complainant exited victim vehicle to attempt to find help. 
Complainant was barely out of the vehicle door when suspect vehicle 
accelerated and drove directly towards complainant." (R 424; T 266). 
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Based on these statements, the State and Mr. Unopulos both 
agreed that officer Jones' police report did not indicate either her 
observance or interpretation of brake or acceleration marks. 
(R 279; T 121). In addition, officer Jones herself admitted that 
she did not mention tire tracks or marks in the police reports. 
(R 422; T 264). She further stated that she was not present to 
independently witness the incident and that after Mr. Bateman had 
voiced the above story to her, Jones in turn recorded ministerially 
those statements in her report. (R 424-25; T 266-67). Other than 
summarizing the complainant's claims, officer Jones' report was 
devoid of any mention of her new contentions that she had 
photographed, observed, and touched the tire marks herself. 
The lower court's strained reading to the contrary is in 
error. Officer Jones' police report gave the defense no notice that 
she would advance her own expert opinion on tire markings discovered 
near the scene or as reflected on Mr. Unopulos' vehicle. 
Consequently, Mr. Unopulos was unable to call his own expert 
witnesses in response to and in defense of Jones' claimed and 
unexpected "expertise". (R 392-93). Cf. Salt Lake City v. 
Reynolds, 849 P.2d 582, 585 (Utah App. 1993) (because the 
prosecution violated discovery by not saying anything about a State 
witness' criminal record, defendant Reynolds did not have to respond 
by moving to compel evidence which he reasonably believed did not 
exist). 
The impact of officer Jones' testimony was perhaps best 
summarized by the prosecution itself. When the court first 
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considered whether to include officer Jones as an expert witness, 
the court decided to exclude Jones following a State acknowledgment 
that the officer's testimony involved "physical evidence, and 
physical evidence would tend to be maybe a little more persuasive 
than verbal evidence." (R 283; T 125). Indeed, prior to officer 
Jones' testimony on the undisclosed evidence, the case was simply a 
verbal credibility determination with one party arguing an 
accidentical collision while the other argued criminal assault. 
However, when the officer offered the previously 
undisclosed and unknown physical evidence, the State's case 
strengthened two-fold. First, the physical evidence testimony 
bolstered its case in chief. Second, Mr. Unopulos' case weakened 
before the jury since he could not counter the officer's claims of 
physical evidence with prepared cross-examination or expert 
witnesses of his own. An independent investigation of the physical 
evidence was stymied by both the nondisclosure of its existence and 
its subsequent destruction. 
The tires on Mr. Unopulos' truck were not held in evidence 
to determine if the wear and tear was in fact consistent with 
acceleration; the tire markings on the street were not available for 
viewing either in person or by photograph because, in officer Jones' 
opinion, they "didn't turn out very well that you could see very 
much in them." (R 391; T 233). Analysis of the rubber scraped off 
the street could not be undertaken as officer Jones disgarded the 
evidence. 
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The court's changed ruling should be reversed. Mark 
Unopulos' position at trial did not alter the State's theory of 
acceleration, nor did his testimony produce an "exigency" 
unanticipated by the State. In contrast, since a war of words and 
attacks on credibility constituted the only concern for 
Mr. Unopulos, the undisclosed physical evidence testimony added 
matters beyond the scope of his prepared defense and resulted in an 
exigency to which he could not respond. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT OFFICER ROSE 
JONES WAS QUALIFIED TO TESTIFY AS AN EXPERT WITNESS 
ABOUT EVIDENCE CRITICAL TO THE JURY BUT BEYOND THE 
SCOPE OF THE OFFICER1S KNOWLEDGE 
"Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that a 
witness may qualify as an expert by reason of his or her knowledge, 
skill, experience, training, or education to give opinion evidence 
regarding scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge." 
Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1993); Utah R. Evid. 702. If a 
party fails to lay an appropriate foundation for expert testimony, 
the expert witness is precluded from testifying. See State v. 
Pendergrass, 803 P.2d 1261 (Utah App. 1990). 
In Pendergrass, for example, expert testimony was excluded 
as being inadequately based and overly speculative. Even though the 
experts, a psychologist and a psychiatrist, were otherwise versed on 
the subject of multiple drug ingestion and its effects on a person's 
state of mind, they did not know enough about the specific situation 
involving defendant Pendergrass to formulate reliable opinions 
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concerning his mental state. Id. at 1265. "While there was 
testimony as to the types and total amounts of drugs in the 
possession of defendant [Pendergrass] and the victim on May 27, 
there was insufficient evidence as to the actual amounts consumed by 
defendant, the timing of the consumption, the purity of the drugs, 
and defendant's tolerance level." _Id. at 1266. The expert 
testimony was deemed properly excluded. Id. 
In Mr. Unopulos' case, the basis for officer Jones' 
"expert" testimony similarly lacked the information necessary for a 
well informed opinion. Officer Jones testified about courses she 
had taken in traffic investigation. (R 387-91; T 229-33) . The 
officer was taught to diagram tire marks and to use different 
formulas for analyzing evidence. (R 390; T 232). In her 
investigation here, however, officer Jones neglected to diagram the 
tire marks in the reports and her photographs of the markings were 
summarily discounted. (R 3 91; T 233) . 
Under "optimum" conditions with good brakes, good friction, 
and a right temperature on the road surface, tire markings could be 
interpreted to reflect a perceived driving pattern. (R 402; T 244). 
According to Jones, skid marks and acceleration marks differ in the 
darkness of the color, the squiggly (versus solid) nature of the 
markings, and the length of the tire track involved. (R 398-400; 
T 240-42). The road conditions at the time of the collision were 
not optimal, however, requiring adjustments in the applicable 
analysis. (R 403; T 245). 
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Fueling officer Jones' evaluation were the complaints 
expressed by the Batemans that acceleration had occurred. (R 427; 
T 269). In the officer's own words, "When I [Jones] first arrived 
at the scene, the Batemans came up to me and they were so upset and 
said the guy hit them, he tried to hit them[.]" (R 419; T 261). 
Pursuant to their statements, Jones claimed to then have noticed 
marks near the scene of the collision which were reflective of 
acceleration. (R 417; T 259). Factors not incorporated into the 
officer's decision, however, included the specific circumstances 
involving Mark Unopulos and the mechanically unsound condition of 
his truck. 
Mr. Unopulos' 1974 pickup had not been serviced for an 
extended period of time. The truck was saddled with alignment 
problems and the steering had the potential to lock up. (R 332; 
T 174) . Uninformed as to these considerations, the officer failed 
to realize the likelihood that acceleration marks resulted from a 
mechanically deficient truck "fishtailing" out of control around a 
corner. (R 341; T 183). Mark Unopulos admitted that his speed of 
25-35 m.p.h. may have been too fast for the situation, (R 3 67, 
375-76; T 209; 217-18), but Jones' investigation omitted such 
factors. 
In any event, little evidentiary reliability exists in an 
officer's identification of "just a scuff", (R 413; T 255), a 
claimed acceleration mark discovered near a well travelled street 
like Fourth South. Officer Jones herself noted that Fourth South is 
"a busily travelled roadway." (R 415; T 257). A scuff mark found 
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near a corner intersection of a busy thoroughfare establishes merely 
that numerous cars had turned there before the accident. 
Further reason for pause stems from the unpreserved or 
destroyed status of the evidence. See, e.g., (R 391; T 233). 
Verification and confirmation of Jones' purported findings cannot be 
made independently even though, as the chief investigating officer, 
(R 416; T 258), she knew that the thoroughness of her reported 
findings may be brought before a judge or jury. (R 422; T 264). 
Unreliability and speculation clouded the entire officer's testimony. 
The lack of good foundational grounds for expert testimony 
was compounded by the fact that the officer's claims proved 
confusing to the jury. Cf. Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 
(Utah App. 1989) ("The critical factor is whether the expert has 
knowledge that can assist the trier of fact in resolving the issues 
before it"). Assuming, arguendo, that officer Jones was qualified 
to testify as an expert, her opinion did not appropriately assist 
the jury. 
In State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461 (Utah App. 1993), an 
expert witness "was called specifically to rebut defendant's 
testimony describing the amount of alcohol he drank on the night of 
the burglary." !Id. at 472. With all relevant information before 
him, the expert helped the jury realize "that if defendant drank 
what he said he drank, his behavior on the night of the burglary 
would have been much different than that described by another 
witness." Id. 
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Officer Jones, however, did little to aid the jury in its 
deliberations. Jones testified that the tire markings found near 
the scene of the collision on Post Street and the marks on the tires 
of Mark Unopulos' pickup were both reflective of acceleration. 
(R 397, 400; T 239, 242). Accordingly, Jones argued, Unopulos' must 
have intended to accelerate his vehicle into the Bateman's Festiva 
in a nonaccidental manner. (R 410; T 252) . 
However, acceleration marks discovered on the truck's tire 
do not assist the jury under the present circumstances. The 
testimony by both parties reveal that acceleration did not occur at 
an isolated time and place. Mark Unopulos testified that after he 
worked on the pickup's brakes, transmission, and clutch, he test 
drove the truck by driving it in and around the city. (R 251; 
T 93). Braking and accelerating occurred. 
Kyle Bateman also observed acceleration. Bateman testified 
that before the collision on Post Street, his car and the pickup 
narrowly missed each other in another intersection. (R 24 9; T 91). 
According to Bateman, after the miss the pickup acclerated after 
him. "[H]e [Unopulos] made that turn coming out of 10th West on 
Fourth South, he left a black mark of rubber and I could see the 
[truck's] tires peeling as he swung around[.]" (R 251; T 93). 
Since both parties revealed that acceleration had occurred at 
locations other than the scene of the collision, officer Jones' 
testimony served only to confuse and mislead the jury on the very 
determination at issue. Jones' opinion, that the pickup had 
accelerated into the Festiva, was improperly premised on the 
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markings found on the truck's tires. (R 410; T 252). Due to many 
instances of acceleration, however, such an opinion was neither well 
founded nor helpful to the jury's understanding of the issue. 
Officer Jones' testimony should have been excluded. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Unopulos respectfully requests this Court to reverse 
his conviction &nd remand the case for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this /%Q day of November, 1994. 
RONKLD SS F{JJINO 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
RICHARD G. UDAY 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the de-
fense upon request the following material or information of which he has 
knowledge: 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefen-
dants; 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant; 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of 
the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of 
the offense for reduced punishment; and 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good 
cause shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the 
defendant to adequately prepare his defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable follow-
ing the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The 
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose 
to the prosecutor such information as required by statute relating to alibi or 
insanity and any other item of evidence which the court determines on good 
cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in order for the 
prosecutor to adequately prepare his case. 
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclo-
sures at least ten days before trial or as soon as practicable. He has a continu-
ing duty to make disclosure. 
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may 
make disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and informa-
tion may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and 
places. 
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discov-
ery or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, or make such other order 
as is appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may permit the party to 
make such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to 
be inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief 
following such an ex parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement 
shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available 
to the appellate court in the event of an appeal. 
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the 
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the 
court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a 
continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or 
it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. 
(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to: 
(1) appear in a lineup; 
(2) speak for identification; 
(3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of other bodily impressions; 
(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the crime; 
(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise; 
(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, fingernail scrapings, 
and other bodily materials which can be obtained without unreasonable 
intrusion; 
(7) provide specimens of handwriting; 
(8) submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body; and 
(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the 
time of the alleged offense. 
Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required for the forego-
ing purposes, reasonable notice of the time and place of such appearance shall 
be given to the accused and his counsel. Failure of the accused to appear or to 
comply with the requirements of this rule, unless relieved by order of the 
court, without reasonable excuse shall be grounds for revocation of pre-trial 
release, may be offered as evidence in the prosecutor's case in chief for consid-
eration along with other evidence concerning the guilt of the accused and 
shall be subject to such further sanctions as the court should deem appropri-
ate. 
Rule 702- Testimony by experts. 
If scientific technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
